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the Islamic Revolution. Its authors, policy advisors in several American lobbies, have a 
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primary source material, misreading the secondary sources and not incorporating the latest 
academic developments. They mainly rely on secondary sources from Western academia, 
with no reference to Iranian authors unless some examples on post-revolutionary violence. 
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prevailing in Iran and the widespread suspicion of foreigners, which seems to be the main 
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strong rulers tend to modernize the country, which improves communications and allow 
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and so on. This model applies to the Tobacco Boycott of 1896, The Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906, Reza Shah’s coup in 1923, Musaddiq’s interregnum until 1953 and 
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external isolation has favored the development of a distinct Iranian civilization. The second 
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on the Qajar dynasty (1786-1921). The Qajars are credited as the initiators of modernization, 
though the success and extent of that modernization is not assessed. Modernization, however, 
increased opposition and facilitated its activities. The Constitutional Revolution undermined 
Iranian economy, promoted chaos and facilitated the division of the country in spheres of 
'.S7%.2%# ,.3# -722%%3'.;# '.&,-'!.# 37$'.;# 15%# Y'$-1# O!$+3#O,$B# *5,A1%$# G!7$# 2!&%$-# 6%R,#
Khan’s regime and the Constitutional interlude between 1941 and 1953. Both Reza Shah and 
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the military, scared of reforms and the dictatorial measures of the nationalist president. The 
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successful, but this was not accompanied by political modernization. The Shah’s megalomaniac 
measures during the seventies increased popular discontent and paved the way to revolution. 
The sixth chapter deals with the Islamic Revolution. The authors claim here that most of the 
opposition did not want revolutionary change but reform. Alas, some unfortunate coincidences 
and its intelligent exploitation by Khomeini accelerated the events. The clerics allied with the 
nationalist liberals and later betrayed them and established themselves as the only rulers of the 
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governments after Khomeini’s death and the end of the war against Iraq. The clerical elites have 
not been able to address the different challenges, and Iran is in need of reform. The last chapter 
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of Iran: the internal contradictions and centers of power of the Islamic Republic may debilitate 
its strength and lead to a popular uprising against the regime.
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Rubin claim that Iran has been a continuous cultural entity from the last three millennia. Islam is 
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A strong nationalist spirit naturally characterizes Iranians, who have always been fearful of 
foreign intervention. This is a strong statement which is not satisfactorily argued. History 
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century the modernizing regimes of Reza Shah and his son tried to trace their legitimacy to pre-
D-+,<'2#K'-1!$E#3!%-#.!1#.%2%--,$'+E#'<A+E#15,1#,#-%.-%#!G#PD$,..%--Q#A$%&,'+%3#'.#15%#A+,1%,7#G!$#
centuries. If so, it would be interesting to assess who supported those proto-nationalist claims 
during the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century and why. Iranian nationalism did not 
fully emerge until the twentieth century in an urban context. The authors rightly highlight the 
existence of repressed minorities, but they fail to contextualize the reasons for the repression 
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of an uninterrupted identity.
Second, the authors read History following traditional, non innovative patterns: they 
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same time, shows the authors' ignorance of basic elements of Iranian pre-modern History: The 
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strategies they were able to negotiate their hegemony in Iran, but they never exercised absolute 
power. The Shiism of the Safavids has not been successfully discussed. If they imported clerics 
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Qajar periods is omitted. While the authors concentrate on minorities in the latter half of the 
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Third, the authors judge Iranian Modern History from a state-building perspective, 
considering accelerated modernization as a necessary and positive step. They fail to assess the 
impact of the modernization process on Iranian population. A strong sense of cultural alienation 
was prominent in the educated middle classes of Iran. Clawson and Rubin depict it as “anti-
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Iranian society than with Western interference6. The authors depict the modernization process 
(the so-called white revolution) under Muhammad Shah Pahlavi as a success. They rely on 
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they do not investigate how this growth impacted the population, how wealth was distributed 
under the Pahlavis, and how did the Shah spend the revenues. The opposition to the Shah 
during the seventies, they argue, was not motivated by hatred of the Shah and modernity but by 
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parties and imposed a single totalitarian party8. On the March 1979 referendum, the authors 
seem to imply that Bazargan was an advocate of a Republic while Khomeini wanted an Islamic 
Republic9. Actually, Bazargan pursued an Islamic Democratic Republic and Khomeini just an 
Islamic Republic10.
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Western Academia, ignoring some of the latter developments in Safavid and Qajar History. Third, 
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the events is biased and strongly ideological, as Manochehr Dorraj has rightly pointed out11.
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